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INTRODUCTION
The daily work of representatives of labor and management is carried out
against the often shifting background of legal decisions and legislation. Decisions by
state and federal courts, labor boards, arbitrators, and administrative agencies, as well
as the deliberations of elected officials, shape the world of labor relations by providing
a set of ground rules under which the parties operate.
These decisions may affect the scope of collective bargaining, the rights and
responsibilities of union organizers, the relationship between state and federal law,
and the expanding panoply of individual employee rights.
In compiling this year’s legal update, we look especially at recent decisions
from the National Labor Relations Board, issues of federal preemption and same sex
marriage cases.

I. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD AND RELATED CASES
A. The Bush Board
The National Labor Relations Board remained stable over the past year in terms
of Board members and is currently at full strength. The full Board still holds a
Republican majority and the current members with their party affiliation and term
expiration dates are:
Peter Schaumber (R)
Wilma Liebman (D)
Robert Battista (Chair) (R)
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expires August 27, 2011
Term expires 12-16-07
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Dennis Walsh (D)
Peter N. Kirsanow (R)

Recess appointment, to extend through 2007 and
nominated to complete term set to end on 12-16-09.
Recess appointment, to extend through 2007 and
nominated to complete term set to end on 8-27-08

B. Unit Cases
In Point Park University v. NLRB, 457 F.2d 42 (D.C. Cir, 2006), the Court
remanded a case to the Board because neither the Regional Director nor the Board
followed the Court’s guidance on the question of managerial status1, nor did they
adequately explain why the faculty’s role at the University was not managerial in nature.
While the Court was prepared to be “deferential” to the Board on the issue of managerial
status, “we cannot be deferential, however, where the Board fails to adequately explain
its reasoning.” In this case, the Board did not explain its reasoning to the satisfaction of
the Court. While both the Regional Director and the Board filled up many pages of
factual findings and referred to many Yeshiva elements, they did not explain “which
factors are significant and which less so, and why” in their determination that the faculty
at Point Park were not managerial. The closest the Regional Director came was a
conclusory statement that Point Park’s “faculty… undoubtedly has an important
consultative role but based on the record developed, it cannot be concluded that they
exercised such plenary, absolute or effective authority or control to warrant their
exclusion from the protection of the Act as managers.” The Court found this an
inadequate substitute for “fact-specific analysis called for by Yeshiva and LemoyneOwens.”
In Columbia College and Illinois Education Association (IEA), 346 NLRB No. 69
(2006), the Illinois Education Association (IEA) represented a unit of Columbia
College’s part-time faculty, and sought to represent a unit of full-time and regular parttime staff employees working in 72 different academic and administrative departments at
the private University. The Board conducted an election pursuant to the parties’
Stipulated Election Agreement. Of the approximately 422 eligible voters, 138 cast
ballots in favor of the Union and 158 cast ballots against representation. In addition,
there were sixty challenged ballots, a number sufficient to affect the results of the
election. Much of the dispute revolved around the votes and representation of
approximately twenty-four non-student tutors in the English department’s writing center
and approximately twelve non-student tutors in the math and science department’s
learning center. Eleven writing center tutors and five learning center tutors voted in the
election but were challenged because their names did not appear on the Excelsior list.
All of the math and science departments’ learning center tutors and most of the
English department’s writing center tutors held part-time faculty positions in their
respective departments in addition to their tutoring jobs. All of the tutors work a parttime schedule in their respective centers and are hired on a semester-by-semester basis
and as a matter of practice have been rehired for each following semester if they wish to
continue tutoring. Writing center tutors are supervised by a non-faculty staff supervisor,
1

As expressed in the Court’s decision in Lemoyne-Owen College v. NLRB, 357 F. 3d 55 (D.C. Cir., 2004).
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while the learning center tutors are supervised by a part-time faculty member who also
holds a tutoring position. Employees in both centers apply separately to work as tutors,
and their tutoring work is not a requirement of their part-time faculty positions. Tutors
work regularly scheduled hours in their respective centers and receive two separate
paychecks, one for teaching and one for tutoring; however, tutoring work is compensated
at a much lower rate than teaching. Tutors in the learning center may occasionally see
students from their classes during their tutoring hours while tutors in the writing center do
not tutor their own students.
Columbia filed objections with the NLRB arguing that all of the challenged voters
were ineligible based on three factors: (1) the individuals were ineligible tutors, (2) the
employees were either managerial or supervisors, and (3) the employees were ineligible
for various specific reasons. Columbia argued that the tutors were not eligible to vote
because they were excluded from the unit under the “faculty” and “independently
contracted tutors” exclusions or because they were dual-function employees covered by a
current collective-bargaining agreement and they did not spend at least 50 percent of their
time performing tutoring work.
The hearing officer recommended that 42 of the 60 ballot challenges be overruled
and recommended sustaining an objection which alleged that the Employer failed to
supply a complete Excelsior list. The hearing officer recommended, in part, that the
challenges to the tutors’ ballots be overruled because the tutors did not fall within the
Stipulated Election Agreement’s exclusion of “independently contracted tutors” from the
unit. In so finding, the hearing officer applied the Board’s independent contractor test
and determined that the learning center and writing center tutors were not independent
contractors within the meaning of Section 2(3) of the Act, but rather were statutory
employees of the college, and had a community of interest with the other staff employees
based on similar job functions, wage rates, lack of benefits, and a lack of evidence in the
record that the tutors do not have a community of interest with the other staff employees.
In addition, the hearing officer found that part-time faculty members holding part-time
tutoring positions were not dual-function employees because they had separate and
distinct employment relationships for each position. He concluded that, as tutors, they
had a community of interest only with the part-time staff employees. However, to the
extent that these tutors were considered to be dual-function employees, the hearing
officer found that they had a sufficient community of interest with the other staff
employees to permit their inclusion in the unit.
The National Labor Relations Board agreed with the hearing officer’s
recommendation to overrule Columbia’s challenges to the ballots and that the Employer
failed to provide sufficient evidence to show that these employees were either excluded
supervisors or ineligible managerial employees. Further, the Board agreed with the
hearing officer that the “independently contracted tutors” exclusion did not apply to the
challenged tutors and that the “faculty” exclusion did not apply to individuals holding
both a faculty position and an included position. In adopting the hearing officer’s
recommendation, the Board noted that the hearing officer’s analysis was consistent with
Caesar’s Tahoe, 337 NLRB 1096, 1097 (2002). In applying the Caesar’s Tahoe test, the
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Board opined that the term “independently contracted tutors” was open to differing
reasonable interpretations, which could not be resolved by reference to the language of
the stipulated election agreement alone. The Board therefore looked to the second prong
of Caesar’s Tahoe to infer that the parties intended to give the words “independently
contracted” the meaning used by the Board and the courts in related contexts. The Board
stated that under general principles of contract interpretation, technical terms and words
of art are given their technical meaning unless the context or usage which is applicable
indicates a different meaning. The Board determined that the hearing officer correctly
found that the parties intended to exclude those who met the test for independentcontractor status, as defined by both the Board and the courts because the record
contained no evidence that the parties intended the term “independently contracted” to be
given anything other than its technical meaning.
The Board next found that the Stipulated Election Agreement’s exclusion of
“faculty” was also ambiguous and therefore looked for other evidence of the parties’
intentions, as required by Caesar’s Tahoe. Because the record contained no evidence of
the parties’ intent in crafting the exclusion, general principles of contract interpretation
did not resolve the issue, and there was nothing in law which would suggest than an
employee who holds two positions, one included in a stipulated unit and one excluded
from that unit, must as a matter of law be excluded from the unit, the Board looked to the
community-of-interest test. In doing so, the Board found that employees holding both an
otherwise eligible staff position and a part-time faculty position were properly included in
the unit, despite some differences between the dual-function employees and most staff
employees. The Board found a similar community of interest because these employees,
when working their non-faculty positions, were paid hourly wages comparable to other
staff employees, like other staff received no benefits, worked specific and limited
schedules like other staff employees, worked under separate supervision from faculty,
and performed non-classroom teaching functions.
The Board noted that an employee with job responsibilities encompassing more
than one position is generally considered a dual-function employee. According to the
Board, the touchstone of dual-function employee status is the fact that a single employee
performs multiple job functions covered by one or more of the employer’s job
classifications. Here, the Board stated that the tutors who also held part-time faculty
positions fell squarely within the scope of the Board’s traditional definition of dualfunction employees. The Board then concluded that the dual-function employees were
eligible to vote in the stipulated unit, as determined by a variant of the Board’s traditional
community-of-interest test. The Board noted that it has long held that employees who
perform more than one function for the same employer may vote, even though they spend
less than a majority of their time on unit work, if they regularly perform duties similar to
those performed by unit members for sufficient periods of time to demonstrate that they
have a substantial interest in working conditions in the unit. The Board agreed with the
hearing officer’s determination that the dual-function tutors had a community of interest
with the employees in the stipulated unit. Further, Columbia, as the party seeking to
exclude the tutors, failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that the tutors did not
have a community of interest with the staff unit.
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The Board further determined that the stipulated bargaining unit did not include
any classifications covered by the existing part-time faculty collective-bargaining
agreement. To the contrary, the stipulated bargaining unit excluded faculty positions
which were covered by that agreement. The dual-function tutors’ job duties as part-time
faculty were separate and independent from their duties as tutors. Instead of holding a
single, integrated job with responsibilities spanning multiple classifications and
potentially multiple collective-bargaining agreements, their duties as faculty and as tutors
were contained within their separate and independent positions. Accordingly, the parttime faculty collective-bargaining agreement did not bar the inclusion of part-time faculty
employees holding part-time tutoring positions in the petitioned-for staff unit.
In Pace University, 349 NLRB 10 (2007), the Board found that the University
committed an unfair labor practice by not bargaining with the certified union over certain
disputed adjunct faculty members. In 2004, the AFT was certified as the representative
of a unit of “all adjunct faculty members, part-time instructors, and all adjunct faculty
members and part-time instructors who work in a non-supervisory dual capacity for the
Employer,” excluding, inter alia, “casual employees.” In setting up the election, the
Regional Director set forth the following voter eligibility criteria: “Eligible to vote in the
election are those in this unit who have received appointments and teach or have taught at
least 3 credit hours and/or 45 hours in any semester in any of two academic year during
the three year period commencing with the 2001-02 academic year and ending with the
2003-04 academic year.”
When bargaining began, a dispute arose between the University and the Union
over the inclusion in the unit of some adjuncts. The University contended that only those
who met the voter eligibility guidelines should be recognized as unit members. The
University contended that an adjunct faculty member does not become a unit member
until he or she has taught three credits and/or 45 hours in a semester in two of the three
preceding three academic years, including the current year. The Union contended that any
faculty member who taught three credits and/or 45 hours in one semester should be in the
unit. After a unit clarification petition was filed, the Regional Director agreed with the
union. The University continued to refuse to bargain over such adjuncts and, hence, the
Administrative Law Judge and the Board found the University in violation of Section 8
(a)(1) and (5).

C. Work Place Rules
As discussed in previous years at this conference, an important area of recent
Board decisions has been the tension between the employer’s right to issue work place
rules of conduct and the employees’ right to engage in protected concerted activity under
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act.
By way of brief background, in 2004, the Board had issued a major decision in
this area. In Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia, 343 NLRB No.75, 176 LRRM 1044
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(2004), by a 3-2 vote, the Board held that work rules prohibiting abusive and profane
language, harassment and verbal, mental and physical abuse were lawful ways of
maintaining order in the workplace and did not chill protected concerted activity by
employees.
The core of the Board’s decision is set forth at the beginning of the decision.
The Board has held that an employer violates Section 8(a)(1) when it maintains a
work rule that reasonably tends to chill employees in the exercise of their Section
7 rights. Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 NLRB 824, 825 (1998). In determining
whether a challenged rule is unlawful, the Board must, however, give the rule a
reasonable reading. It must refrain from reading particular phrases in isolation,
and it must not presume improper interference with employee rights. Id. at 825,
827. Consistent with the foregoing, our inquiry into whether the maintenance of a
challenged rule is unlawful begins with the issue of whether the rule explicitly
restricts activities protected by Section 7. If it does, we will find the rule
unlawful. If the rule does not explicitly restrict activity protected by Section 7, the
violation is dependent upon a showing of one of the following: (1) employees
would reasonably construe the language to prohibit Section 7 activity; (2) the rule
was promulgated in response to union activity; or (3) the rule has been applied to
restrict the exercise of Section 7 rights.
Since 2004, other decisions have dealt with work place rules in light of this case.
Guardsmark, LLC, 344 NLRB 97 (2005); Double Eagle Hotel & Casino, 414 F. 3d 1249
(10th Cir, 2005).
In February of this year, the aforementioned Guardsmark case came up for review
before the D.C. Circuit. In the decision below, the Board had held that two workplace
rules – one requiring that employees register their complaints only through the chain of
command and the other barring solicitation – violated the NLRA. The Board found that a
third rule barring “fraternization” was lawful because the Board thought employees
would not reasonably interpret it to interfere with protected activities. The union (SEIU,
Local 24/7) challenged this ruling, and the company challenged the ruling on the other
two rules. The Court upheld the Board ruling that the chain of command rule and the
solicitation rule were illegal, and, in addition, it agreed with the union that this
fraternization rule was also illegal. Guardsmark, LLC v. NLRB, 2007 WL 283455 (DC
Cir., 2007).
Guardsmark is a company providing security guard services to clients. The
fraternization rule in question stated that “while on duty, you must NOT …. fraternize on
duty or off duty, date or become friendly with the client’s employees or with co
employees. The Board had found that nothing in this rule ran afoul of the Act. Observing
that the rule lists “fraternize” next to two terms referring to romantic relationships among
employees – “date” and “become overly friendly” – the Board concluded that “employees
would reasonably understand the rule to prohibit only personal entanglements rather than
activity protected by the Act.”
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The Court did not think that the “neighborhood” approach on words that the
Board used held any water. The Court said that a reasonable employee would look at the
rule and believe that the word “fraternize” held some independent meaning other than
“dating” or “becoming overly friendly.” Quoting Merriam Webster’s Collegiate
Dictionary, 10th edition, the Court noted that “fraternize” is defined as meaning “to
associate or mingle as brothers or on fraternal terms.” It found similar definitions in five
other dictionaries and ultimately concluded that “employees would reasonably interpret
the rule to prevent them from discussing terms and conditions of employment. In other
words, we find unreasonable the Board’s conclusion that employees would understand
the rule to prohibit only personal entanglements rather than activity protected by the
Act.”
D. Definition of “Supervisor” under the NLRA
The NLRA excludes supervisors from its coverage. Section 2 (11) of the Act defines
a supervisor as:
(11) The term "supervisor" means any individual having authority, in the interest
of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge,
assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to
adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection
with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or
clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment.
This definition has been a source of hundreds of cases over the years as the Board
sorts out representation questions.
Certainly one of the lead decisions from the past year from the Board was Oakwood
Health Care, Inc. 348 NLRB No. 37 (Sept. 29, 2006). This decision represents the
Board’s latest thinking on how supervisory status should be interpreted for professional
employees. In question was the status of certain charge nurses and whether or not they
should be included in a unit of all registered nurses at Oakwood Heritage Hospital in
Taylor, Michigan.
The Board handled this case following a consideration of amicus briefs from many
parties on both sides of the issue in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in NLRB v.
Kentucky River Community Care, 532 U.S. 706 (2001). In Kentucky River, the Court had
taken issue with the Board’s interpretation of the term “independent judgment” to
exclude the exercise of “ordinary professional or technical judgment in directing less
skilled employees to deliver services.” The Board’s view had been that, even if a Section
2(11) function is exercised with a substantial degree of discretion, there is no
“independent judgment” if the judgment was of a particular kind, namely “ordinary
professional or technical judgment.” The Court found this to be clear error, and noted that
it is the degree of discretion involved in making the decision, not the kind of discretion
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exercised –whether professional, technical or otherwise – that determines the existence of
“independent judgment” under section 2 (11) of the Act.
In addressing this basic question of what constitutes “independent judgment,” the
Board first noted that a judgment is not “independent” if it is “dictated or controlled by
detailed instructions, whether set forth in company policies or rules, the verbal
instructions of a higher authority or in the provisions of collective bargaining
agreements.” The Board said, for example, a decision to staff a shift with a certain
number of nurses would not involve independent judgment if it is determined by a fixed
nurse-patient ratio requirement. Nor would independent judgment be involved if a person
were merely following strict seniority rules in assigning work.
The Board also noted that not all professional judgments are supervisory. Thus, a
charge nurse who makes a professional judgment that a particular patient requires
monitoring does not become a supervisor unless he or she assigns an employee to that
patient or responsibly directs that employee in carrying out the monitoring function.
The Board explained that when an individual is engaged a part of the time as a
supervisor, and the rest of the time as a unit employee, the legal standard for a
supervisory determination is “whether the individual spends a regular and substantial
portion of his/her work time performing supervisory functions. While the Board did not
adopt a strict numerical definition of substantiality, it did note that it has found
supervisory status “where individuals have served in a supervisory role for at least 10-15
percent of their total work time.”
On the specific aspects of supervisory status, the Board discussed the question of
whether the charge nurses had authority in the area of work assignments. On the general
question of what constitutes “assign,” the Board stated that “the ordinary meaning of the
term “assign” is “to appoint to a post or duty.” It went on to say:
We construe the term ‘assign’ to refer to the act of designating an employee to a
place (such as a location, department, or wing); appointing an employee to a time
(such as a shift or overtime period); or giving significant overall duties, i.e. tasks,
to an employee.
Second, the Board stated that the statutory phrase of “responsibly to direct” meant
direction that involved accountability. Thus, either the employee giving direction could
hold the employee given direction accountable for not complying (e.g. corrective action),
or that the employee giving direction could be held accountable by a higher authority for
the direction given.
Using this guidance, the Board found that the permanent (as opposed to rotating)
charge nurses “assign” nursing personnel to patients. At the beginning of each shift, and
as patients are admitted thereafter, the charge nurse assigns the staff working the unit to
the patients they will then care for. The charge nurses’ assignments determine what will
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be the required work for an employee during the shift, thereby having a material effect on
the employee’s terms and conditions of employment.
The Board noted that this assignment authority was also exercised with the use of
independent judgment. The charge nurses make their assignments by choosing among the
staff available. In the health care context, choosing among available staff frequently
requires independent judgment and discretion.
Matching a nurse with a patient may have life and death consequences. Nurses are
professionals, not widgets, and may possess different levels of training and
specialized skills. Similarly, patients are not identical and may require highly
particularized care. A charge nurse’s analysis of an available nurse’s skill set and
level of proficiency at performing certain tasks and her application of that analysis
in matching that nurse to the condition and needs of a particular patient, involves
a degree of discretion markedly different than the assignment decisions exercised
by most leadmen.
Based on this, the Board found that the charge nurses must exercise a substantial
degree of discretion sufficient to constitute independent judgment and make them
supervisors under the Act. By contrast, charge nurses in the emergency room did not
meet this level of discretion and were instead included in the unit since they did not make
particular assignments of staff to patients and did not take into account patient acuity or
nursing skills in making geographic assignments within the ER.
While the Board did not believe its decision represented a “sea change” in
interpreting the Act, the dissent of Members Liebman and Walsh disagreed, claiming that
the Board had in effect excluded thousands of professional employees from
representation rights. The dissent took issue with what it believed to be a broad reading of
“assign” in the majority’s decision. The dissent would not have read the term “assign” to
include task assignments, but only on the issues of determining an employee’s position
with the employer; designated work site; or designated work hours. In short, “it must be
the employees who are assigned not the tasks.” From the dissent’s point of view, the
assignment of tasks fits better under the question of whether the individual “responsibly
directs” the employee.
On this latter question of what it means to “responsibly to direct,” the dissent
argued for a more limited definition, contending that it only occurs when 1) the person
has been delegated substantial authority to ensure that a work unit achieves
management’s objectives and is thus “in charge” 2) is held accountable for the work of
others; and 3) exercises significant discretion and judgment in directing his or her work
unit. In essence, the dissent argued that the majority’s ruling encompasses “workers who
have neither the genuine prerogatives of management, nor the statutory rights of ordinary
employees.”
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Efforts were afoot in Congress this Spring to develop guidelines to determine the
supervisory status of charge nurses in an effort to blunt or reverse the impact of the
Oakwood decision. (See Daily Labor Report, BNA, 3/23/07).
E. Supervisors’ Support for a Union
In 2004, the Board had issued a significant decision in Harborside Healthcare
Inc., 343 NLRB No. 100, 176 LRRM 1113 (2004), where the Board held in a 3-2
decision that the pro-union activities of a nursing home charge nurse who later was
found to be a supervisor amounted to objectionable conduct that interfered with the
holding of a fair representation election.
In that case, the Board set forth in detail the criteria it would use to decide
whether or not a supervisor’s pro-union activity would be sufficient to overturn an
election.
[W]e take this opportunity to restate the legal standard to be applied in cases
involving objections to an election based on supervisory prounion conduct.
When asking whether supervisory pro-union conduct upsets the requisite
laboratory conditions for a fair election, the Board looks to two factors.
(1) Whether the supervisor’s prounion conduct reasonably tended to coerce or
interfere with the employees’ exercise of free choice in the election.
This inquiry includes: (a) consideration of the nature and degree of
supervisory authority possessed by those who engage in the prounion
conduct; and (b) an examination of the nature, extent, and context of the
conduct in question.
(2) Whether the conduct interfered with freedom of choice to the extent that it
materially affected the outcome of the election, based on factors such as (a)
the margin of victory in the election; (b) whether the conduct at issue was
widespread or isolated; (c) the timing of the conduct; (d) the extent to which
the conduct became known; and (e) the lingering effect of the conduct.
In SNE Enterprises, Inc. 348 NLRB 69 (2006), the Board found that leadperson’s
role in soliciting authorization cards constituted objectionable conduct that warranted
setting aside the election. In this case, several leadpersons, each of whom supervised
about 20 employees, directly solicited cards from some of their subordinates during a
union drive at their window and door manufacturing plant. After the petition for an
election was filed, three of the leadpersons continued to publicly support the Union,
telling employees that the union would help them get better benefits and treatment from
the employer, and that the union would secure just cause protection for them.
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In setting aside the election, the Board followed the Harborside guidelines. The
Regional Director below had not found objectionable conduct under Harborside, noting
that: the leads had a lack of power to significantly affect the employees’ working
conditions; the employees did not perceive the leads as supervisors; in prior elections,
leads had been eligible to vote; the employer specifically campaigned against the union.
But the Board did not believe this avoided a finding of coercion. The Board noted
that collectively these leadpersons purposely targeted the vast majority of their
subordinates. While these supervisors did not have any power of hiring and firing, they
had the clear authority to assign and direct work and as such can impact broadly on their
subordinates’ work life. The leads campaigned here for an extensive period, well after
the cards were filed, but even if solicitation of cards ceased after the petition was filed,
such evidence, without more, is insufficient to negate the inherent coerciveness of the
original solicitations. Employees who sign such cards may reasonably feel obligated to
carry through on their stated intention to support the union, and the number of signed
cards may paint a false portrait of employee support for the union.
While the employer did conduct an anti union campaign, the employer never
disavowed specifically the actions of the leads in soliciting employees. Further, the fact
that the leads were not deemed supervisors in prior elections is irrelevant to this case.
Finally, as to the impact of this conduct on the election, the election turned out to be
very close, with the union winning 87-82 with three challenged ballots. More than 35
employees had been solicited by the leads. Further, the impact of their solicitation was
not isolated to the 35 employees; it was widely known among the employees that some of
the leads were active members of the union organizing committee. The lingering effect
of their solicitation carried forth to election day.
F. Other Election Conduct
In S.T.A.R., Inc. Lighting the Way, 347 NLRB 008 (2006), the Board ordered that
an election won by District 1199, SEIU at a health care facility be set aside. During the
campaign, a union organizer gave a brochure to an employee that said, inter alia, “there
is a one time $50 initiation fee. Workers who organize to join 1199 are exempt, and begin
paying dues once a contract is won.” This left the impression that initiation fees would
be waived only for those who supported the union before the election. At a later meeting
with employees prior to the election, an organizer explained that there would be no
initiation fee for anyone working at the facility before the union obtains a contract.
In analyzing this case, the Board noted that a union interferes with free choice
when it offers to waive initiation fees for only those employees who manifest support for
the union before an election. NLRB v. Savair Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 270 (1973). When a
union makes an ambiguous offer to waive fees, it is the union’s duty to clarify that
ambiguity or suffer the consequences that might attach to employees’ possible
interpretations of the ambiguity. Inland Shoe Mfg. Co, 211 NLRB 724 (1974).
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In the hearing officer’s view, the union’s brochure in this case was certainly
ambiguous and could have led employees to believe that only those active organizers and
union supporters would have their initiation fee waived and that those who oppose the
union or were neutral would not. However, the hearing officer believed the union
satisfied its obligation to clarify the ambiguity. The Board disagreed.
The Board noted that everyone received the ambiguous brochure, either directly
from union organizers or from the employer, who put the last page of the brochure in
everyone’s mailbox. However, the union never articulated its nonobjectionable waiver
policy to those 136 eligible voters. Only 18 members attended the union meeting where
the policy was explained.
The dissenting member of the Board in this case (Liebman) tried to argue that the
employer should not benefit from the fact that it was the employer who placed the
brochure in the boxes of all employees, thereby making sure that all employees were
aware of the ambiguous statement. The union claimed it did not know about such
dissemination. The Board majority, however, noted that the result should not depend on
whether the party who engaged in the objectionable conduct knew about the
dissemination of that conduct. The issue is not whether a party should be punished but
rather whether the employees have been exposed to conduct that interfered with their free
choice.
Thus, the critical facts in this case are that the Petitioner’s brochure contained an
objectionable statement, that the statement was distributed to 136 employees, and
that the Petitioner did not, as required by Board precedent, clarify its policy for
most of these employees. The fact that the Petitioner was unaware of the
distribution and so arguably saw no need to clarify its policy is beside the point.
The point is that the Petitioner’s ambiguous fee-waiver statement reasonably
tended to coerce a determinative number of employees in their election choice.
Consequently, and to avoid sanctioning a tainted election result, we take into
consideration the fact that all of the employees were exposed to the objectionable
statement.

G. Use of E-Mail during Campaigns
In Media Gen. Operations Inc. d/b/a Richmond Times Dispatch v. NLRB, 4th Cir,
No. 06-1023, unpublished opinion, 3/15/07, reported in DLR, 3/30/07, the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals enforced a Board order against a newspaper company that barred
employees from using the corporate email system to discuss union matters but did not bar
the use of the system for other nonbusiness use. While the company did have a policy of
barring all personal use of email, this policy was not enforced, and many employees
routinely used the system for messages relating to charities, social events and personal
matters without being disciplined. However, the policy was enforced selectively against
those employees who sent emails dealing with union solicitation.
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In a most important case for future organizing campaigns, on March 27, 2007, the
question of whether employees have any right to use their employers’ email systems to
communicate with one another about unionization and related matters was argued orally
before the NLRB in the case of Guard Publishing Company, d/b/a The Register-Guard,
NLRB No. 36-CA-8743-1, as reported in Daily Labor Report, 3/28/07, BNA. The case
arose when the company issued a memo indicating that the email system –along with its
telephones, copying machines, fax machines and message machines – were not to be used
for solicitation of any kind. When some employees used the email system for unionrelated matters, they were disciplined and charges ensued. The Administrative Law Judge
for the NLRB had found that, since the company allowed the email to be used for
personal matters, it was discriminating against employees who sent union-related emails.
The NLRB General Counsel urged the full Board to balance employees’ rights under
Section 7 with employers’ business interests in regulating the use of emails and to
accommodate both interests as much as possible. The General Counsel urged that any
policy banning all nonbusiness e-mail use should be deemed presumptively illegal absent
some showing of special circumstances. During the oral argument, one of the Board
members noted that employers frequently monitor their email systems to prevent
computer viruses and liability for illegal conduct and asked the General Counsel if such
employers could be charged with illegal surveillance of employees’ union activity. The
General Counsel agreed that employers have that right to monitor email and that
employees should have no expectation of privacy in email communication.
The union argued that the Board should hold that whenever an employer allows its
email to be used for nonbusiness use, it must allow employees to use the email system to
communicate about unions or other concerted activity. The union did acknowledge that
employers may restrict such email communications to nonworking time. Union counsel
was asked by one of the Board members about union email communications to
employees, and he responded that it would be illegal discrimination for an employer to
block emails from the union.
On the other hand, the company argued that the email system is the company’s
equipment and private property and that the company has the right to regulate and restrict
its use and that there is no section 7 right to use it for non business purposes. The email
system is private property and subject to legal prohibitions on trespass. Counsel for the
company was asked whether an employee who sent an email complaining about wages to
other employees would be in violation of the policy. He responded that that would not
violate the policy because it would not be on behalf of an outside organization; it would
not be solicitation. But if an email expressed an interest in getting a union, that becomes
an email that is made on behalf of an outside organization and would be solicitation.
Hopefully, the various issues that the Board will examine in this case include:
1.

Do employees have a right to use their employer’s e-mail system (or other
computer-based communication systems) to communicate with other employees
about union or other concerted, protected matters? If so, what restrictions, if any,
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may an employer place on those communications? If not, does an employer
nevertheless violate the Act if it permits non-job-related e-mails but not those
related to union or other concerted, protected matters?;
2.

Should the Board apply traditional rules regarding solicitation and/or distribution
to employees’ use of their employer’s e-mail system? If so, how should those
rules be applied? If not, what standard should be applied?

3.

If employees have a right to use their employer’s e-mail system, may an employer
nevertheless prohibit e-mail access to its employees by non-employees? If
employees have a right to use their employer’s e-mail system, to what extent may
an employer monitor that use to prevent unauthorized use?

4.

In answering the foregoing questions, of what relevance is the employee’s
workplace? For example, should the Board take account of whether the employee
works at home or at some location other than a facility maintained by the
employer?;

5.

Is employees’ use of their employer’s e-mail system a mandatory subject of
bargaining? Assuming that employees have a Section 7 right to use their
employer’s e-mail system, to what extent is that right waivable by their
bargaining representative?;

6.

How common are employer policies regulating the use of employer e-mail
systems? What are the most common provisions of such policies? Have any such
policies been agreed to in collective bargaining? If so, what are their most
significant provisions and what, if any, problems have arisen under them?

7.

Are there any technological issues concerning e-mail or other computer-based
communication systems that the Board should consider in answering the
foregoing questions?
H. Preemption

Since the time of our founding fathers, the fundamental tension in our
constitutional system resides in the relative power and authority of the federal
government and state governments. In the legal world, this issue often arises under the
heading of preemption – the principle that in some regulated areas of society Congress
through its legislative authority has preempted the field, and states cannot pass legislation
that does violence to that federal oversight.
In the past year, preemption cases continued to arise in the labor law sector. One
case deserving of some attention is Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v Lockyear, 437
F.3d 890 (9th Cir. 2006). This case had actually been heard before by the Court in 2005.
In Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Lockyear, 2005 U.S. App LEXIS 19208, 422
F.3d 973, (9th Cir, September, 2005), a three judge panel for the U.S. Court of Appeals
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for the Ninth Circuit had originally found that a California state law which prohibited
employers receiving more than $10,000 in state funds from using any of those funds to
“assist, promote or deter union organizing” interfered with an employer’s right to free
speech under Section 8 (c) of the NLRA and was thus preempted by that Act. The Court
wrote:
Although cast nominally as an effort to ensure state neutrality, the California
statute, by discouraging employers from exercising their protected speech rights,
operates to significantly empower labor unions as against employers. In doing so,
the California statute runs roughshod over the delicate balance between labor
unions and employers as mandated by Congress through the National Labor
Relations Act.
The statute in question (A.B.1889) established a state policy “not to interfere with an
employee’s choice about whether to join or to be represented by a labor union” by
subsidizing either side of the argument. Thus, the law prohibited all recipients of state
grants and private employers that receive more than $10,000 annually in state funds from
using “any of those funds to assist, promote or deter union organizing,” which was
further defined as “any attempt by an employer to influence the decision of its employees
in this state or those of its subcontractors regarding …. [w]hether to support or oppose a
labor organization that represents or seeks to represent those employees… or [w]hether to
become a member of any labor organization.” An employer who qualified under this
language could not use state funds for “any expense, including legal and consulting fees
and salaries of supervisors and employees, incurred for research for, or preparation,
planning or coordination of, or carrying out, an activity to assist, promote, or deter union
organizing.” The employers also would have been required to keep detailed records to
show the funds have not been used for improper purposes. The law further created a
presumption that if state and nonstate funds were commingled in any way, the state funds
were used for an illegal purpose.
Violations of the law would not merely involved loss of state funds but included
fines and treble damages and the employer could be sued by both the State and by private
taxpayers.
In striking down the statute, the Court wrote:
We conclude that the California statute, which is far from the neutral enactment
that the state attorney general and the unions contend it to be, significantly
undermines the speech rights of employers related to union organizing campaigns.
Under the guise of preserving state neutrality with respect to labor relations, it
directly conflicts with employers’ rights as granted by the Act.
*

*
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By creating exacting compliance burdens, strict accounting requirements, the
threat of lawsuits, and onerous penalties, the statute chills employer speech on the
merits of unionism. 2
But the 2005 decision by the three judge panel was not the final word, and it was
withdrawn from publication. Instead, on January 17, 2006, the Court granted rehearing en
banc in the case. And on September 21, 2006, the Court ruled that the law did not
undermine federal labor policy and was not preempted by the NLRA.
In this case, the NLRB itself had filed an amicus brief urging preemption. The Board
had argued that AB 1889 “works at cross purposes with such a policy [of employee free
choice on the question of unionization] because it limits the flow of information to
employees by regulating employer speech in an area – an organizational election – that
Congress did intend to be controlled by the free play of economic forces.”
But the Court disagreed, noting that AB 1889 does not prohibit an employer from
using non-state funds to express its opinions; it only restricts state grant and program
funds from being so used. The Court said that this case does not involve what is referred
to as “Machinists’ preemption.”3 That type of preemption occurs when a state seeks to
regulate an activity that, while not expressly protected or prohibited by the Act, is an
activity that Congress nonetheless intended to be controlled solely by the “free play of
economic forces.” Since the Court found that election conduct is indeed regulated by the
NLRB itself, through its decisional law, then election conduct cannot fall into that
unfettered zone where the free play of economic forces trumps all state action. Moreover,
California did not condition receipt of state funds on employers’ declaration of neutrality
in union campaigns. Employers can take any position they want under this law. They just
cannot use the state funds to advance their purposes. Accordingly, the Court found that
preemption based on the Machinists’ case is not applicable here.
The Court also found that there was no Garmon preemption either. 4 In this type,
there is an actual or potential conflict between state regulation and federal labor law due
to state regulation of activity that is actually or arguably protected or prohibited by the
NLRA. Garmon thus protects NLRB jurisdiction over the conduct expressly protected or
prohibited by the Act, while, by contrast, Machinists preemption concerns conduct that
Congress left to laissez-fare. On this point, the Court again rejected arguments that the
employers’ free speech rights, guaranteed by Section 8 (c) of the NLRA, and the First
Amendment, have been infringed upon by AB 1889. That act did not limit employer free
speech in any way.

2

This was actually the second time the Court had ruled on the legislation. In Chamber of Commerce v.
Lockyer, 364 F. 3d 1154 (9th Cir., 2004), the Court had previously ruled that California’s “neutrality”
legislation limited the free exchange of ideas and free speech during a union campaign and was inconsistent
with national labor policy as delineated in the National Labor Relations Act. However, at that time, the
AFL-CIO secured a reconsideration of the case and the 2004 opinion was withdrawn.
3
So called based on the case of Machinists v., Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, 427 U.S. 132
(1976) which delineated the principles.
4
San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
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The three members of the Court who disagreed noted that “once the state has chosen
to award a contract to the lowest responsible bidder, the state’s interest in the funds it
pays for the contracted goods and services is at an end…. Simply because a business
chooses to contract with the state does not mean that the state may abrogate First
Amendment rights…. Free market choice or not, these employers retain their First
Amendment rights to spend their own funds, as the undoubtedly earn by contracting with
the state, as they see fit.”
Furthermore, the dissenters noted that the statute is clearly tilted in the unions’ favor;
it is not as neutral as it appears. Rare is the employer that will use funds to encourage
employees to unionize. Thus, by restricting the use of state funds, the state has taken a
position in favor of unionization and has thus tilted the scales in an arena in which it did
not belong. The statute strikes at the heart of employer free speech under section 8 (c )
and should have been deemed preempted.
In contrast to Lockyear, however, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in New York
overturned a lower court ruling and held that a New York law restricting employers from
using state money to encourage or discourage union organizing is preempted by the
National Labor Relations Act. Healthcare Association of NY Stat, Inc. v. Pataki, (Case
no. 05-2570, U.S. App. LEXIS 29857, December 5, 2006). That law, which had taken
affect in December of 2002, provided that “no monies appropriated by the state for any
purpose shall be used or made available to employers” for training managers regarding
methods to encourage or discourage union activity or for participation in union drives;
hiring attorneys, consultants, or contractors to engage in such activity; and paying
employees whose principal job duties are to engage in such activities. The Court focused
on section 8 (c) of the Act and noted that 8 (c) was meant to expand speech rights.
Section 8 (c) “does protect employer speech in a unionization campaign context and can
provide a basis for Garmon preemption.”
While the Court also felt that Machinists’ preemption may be present as well, it stated
that “the ultimate question depends on the same factors we considered relevant in our
Garmon discussion: whether section 211-a burdens moneys that cannot properly be said
to belong to the state (because they either belong to the contractors or to federal or local
governments) and whether the State can accomplish its goal of saving money by limiting
the kind of costs for which it will reimburse program participants. These questions in turn
depend on disputed facts which cannot be decided on summary judgment.”
Put another way, the court noted that “to the extent that section 211-a functions as a
restriction on what use may be made of State grants, it is not preempted by Garmon.”
However, “to the extent that section 211-a imposes restrictions on the association’s and
their members use of proceeds earned from state contracts and statutory reimbursement
obligations in which the contractor’s labor costs cannot affect the amount of expense to
the State, it attempts to impose limitations on the use of the association’s money rather
than the State’s; it therefore deters employers from the exercise of their rights under
section 8 (c ) of the Act and satisfies the threshold conditions for Garmon preemption.”
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Further, to the extent section 211-a might be interpreted to apply to funds that were
originally appropriated by the federal government and only “pass through” the State en
route to the contractors who earned the funds, it would exceed the State’s legitimate
interest in controlling its own money.” For example, Medicare and Medicaid money
might be said to simply pass through the state – and thus cannot be restricted by the State
as to its use. However, the record was incomplete on this issue, and thus the court would
not rule explicitly on this question. Ultimately, the case was thus remanded for further
proceedings.
Other preemption cases are of interest over the past year. One such significant case
was Retail Industries Leaders Association v. Fielder, a case involving ERISA preemption
rather than NLRA preemption. The law in question is Maryland’s Fair Share Health Care
Fund Act, which requires very large employers to contribute a minimum percentage of
wages for employee health care coverage or pay the difference to a public health care
fund. Only employers with 10,000 employees would be affected, and such employers
would have to spend at least 6% of their payroll on health care costs, or else pay the
difference into the state fund. Out of all employers covered, only Wal-Mart does not
meet this 6% threshold.
On February 7, 2006, the Retail Industry Leaders Association challenged the law in
the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland claiming, among other arguments,
that the law was preempted by ERISA. The statute was characterized in the lawsuit
(Retail Industry Leaders Association, v. Fielder, Docket No. 06-316, D. Md.) as “an
unlawful intrusion on the comprehensive federal framework for the administration and
regulation of employee benefit plans” that Congress has laid out in ERISA.
The defenders of the legislation argued that the law is not preempted because the state
was seeking to regulate employers, not ERISA plans. The law would not require
employers to set up ERISA plans, and only requires the employer to spend a certain
amount of money on health care costs, and if they do not, they must contribute to a state
fund. On the other state of the argument, opponents claimed that the statute “relates” to a
benefit plan because the natural consequence of the legislation will be for companies to
modify their plans.
The District Court agreed that the law was preempted because the law effectively
required employers to spend a minimum amount on health care benefit plans. It did not
find that the act violated the Equal Protection Clause because the state’s classifications
were not irrational. Both sides appealed to the Fourth Circuit.
On the preemption question, the Court observed first that ERISA did not mandate that
employers establish specific benefit plans; it merely regulated such plans that an
employer chooses to establish. The primary objective of ERISA was to “provide a
uniform regulatory regime over employee benefit plans,” and to accomplish that, ERISA
broadly preempts, by its own language, “any and all State laws insofar as they may now
or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan.” 29 U.S.C. Section 1144(a).
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In applying this concept to the Maryland Act, the Court noted that any “reasonable
employer” would not pay the State a sum of money that it could instead spend on its
employees’ healthcare. Thus, the “only rational choice employers have under the Fair
Share Act is to structure their ERISA healthcare benefit plans so as to meet the minimum
spending threshold. The Act thus fall squarely under Shaw’s5 prohibition of state
mandates on how employers’ structure their ERISA plans.” In the Court’s view, then, the
Act clearly has an “obvious ‘connection with’ employee benefit plans and is so
preempted by ERISA. Retail Industry Leaders Association v. Fielder, _ F.3d _, 2007
WL102157 (4TH Cir., 2007).
In George v. AT & T Corp., (D. Mass, 2006), the federal district court in
Massachusetts held that a former AT & T employee’s state law claim that the company
had misrepresented to her that workforce reductions were going to take place, thus
inducing her to retire before she became eligible for severance pay was preempted by the
National Labor Relations Act. In the opinion of the court, resolution of her state claim
necessarily “depended on” the terms of the collective bargaining agreement between AT
&T and the Communications Workers of America, and thus the case was preempted by
Section 301 of the Act. The employee, who had worked 30 years with the company,
claimed that prior to her retirement she asked the company if workforce reductions were
planned. She was told no. But six weeks after she retired the company announced a large
scale reduction and, had she still been employed at the time, she would have received 100
weeks of severance pay.
In finding preemption, the court agreed with the company that the issue of whether
she was defrauded out of severance benefits was an issue arising from and governed by
the bargaining agreement, and thus preempted by Section 301.
In NLRB v. North Dakota, (D. ND, No. 1:06-cv-064m 2/1/07), a federal district court
ruled that a North Dakota law that required union-represented employees to pay a
representation fee to the union if they choose not to join was preempted by the NLRA.
North Dakota is a right to work state and employees cannot be forced to join the union.
The legislature believed that employees who do not voluntarily join should be forced to
pay a fee to the union and not be a “free rider.” If a union processes a grievance for a
non-member, then “that labor union shall collect the actual representation expenses from
the nonunion employee.” (ND Century Code, Section 34-01-14.1.
The NLRB filed an action requesting declaratory judgment that this law was
preempted. The Board further argued that such a fee would have a “coercive effect on
non member employees in the exercise of their right not to join” a labor union. The Court
agreed with the Board. It noted that the law conflicts with Section 7 of the Act, since
employees are free to refrain from all union activity if they choose. The effect of the
legislation would be to “inject an agency fee requirement into every collective bargaining
agreement written in this state.” Section 8 (b) (1) (A) of the Act makes it an unfair labor
practice for a union to restrain or coerce an employee in the exercise of his or her Section
5

Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85,91 (1983).
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7 rights. By directing unions to collect fees from non-members, the Court noted, the law
“requires unions to engage in conduct which is prohibited by the NLRA.”
I. Disloyalty and Section 7 Rights
A couple of cases from last year highlight the tension between reasonable employee
loyalty to the organization and Section 7 concerted activity rights.
In PHC-Elko Inc, 347 NLRB 143 (2006), the Board dealt with a case of an organizing
effort at a hospital among its service and technical employees. During the campaign, the
employer held some small group meetings with employees in which employer
representatives argued that employees did not need a union. The COO, Rick Kilburn,
then noted that there had been rumors about substandard care at the hospital and that all
employees should serve as “ambassadors and marketers” for the hospital and that such an
effort would result in better conditions at the hospital and better working conditions for
the employees. One employee, Wanda Pollard, stated that she would rather resign than
say anything positive about the hospital. She then related to the group how poorly her
husband had been treated when he was a patient. In the ensuing discussion, Kilburn asked
her why she worked for the hospital if she felt so strongly about this.
Later in the conversation Kilburn was discussing the jail kitchen operation and
whether it was profitable. Pollard said she didn’t want to work for the hospital; she
wanted to work for the county. Kilburn said she would get her wish if the hospital did not
retain its contract to operate the jail kitchen.
When Kilburn was done, he turned the meeting over to the hospital’s chief financial
operator who began a presentation on the hospital’s patient census. At that point, Pollard
stood up and said “come on, girls, we’ve got to cook the food for the prisoners.” Kilburn
told Pollard to sit down, that he had not closed the meeting. Pollard said she didn’t have
to, it was a free country, and she reported to the county sheriff anyway. After he ended
the meeting, Kilburn told Pollard to stay after, at which point he fired her. In the follow
up termination letter, Kilburn wrote: “During the mandatory employee meeting today, in
front of several other employees, you consistently showed your nonsupport of working at
Elko General Hospital and how you “want to go back to being county.” You also made
comments about how you would not utilize Elko services due to a bad experience your
husband had in the past, again showing no support for your employer. The last think you
did was to dismiss the meeting yourself telling the employees that they all needed to get
back to work.”
The General Counsel of the NLRB contended that she was fired for concerted
activity. The administrative law judge found that Elko had indeed fired her for concerted
activity. He noted that when Kilburn asked the employees to be ambassadors for the
hospital and linked it to improved working conditions if they did, then he established a
term and condition of employment. When Pollard protested, she was in essence
criticizing the terms of her employment and was thus engaging in protected activity.
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While the judge found her conduct rude, he did not find it sufficient egregious to
overcome the finding that she had been discharged for concerted activity.
The Board correctly saw this as a mixed motive case. The Board began its inquiry by
assuming arguendo that Elko had in fact established a new term of employment as the
ALJ suggested, and that Pollard was engaging in protected activity in protesting that new
term. The Board assumed arguendo that General Counsel met his burden of showing she
was discharged for engaging in protected activity.
The Board then turned to the other two reasons for the discharge and examine
whether, under the Wright Line 6 analysis, the hospital would have fired her anyway.
The two reasons were Pollard’s attempt to shut down the meeting and undermine
Kilburn’s authority and that she advocated the demise of her own employer at the jail.
She advocated that the county replace her employer in running the jail kitchen.
Clearly, an employer need not tolerate the disloyal actions of an employee who
wishes to oust her own employer from its position as employer. In sum, we find
that Pollard was lawfully discharged when she insubordinately attempted to call
to a halt the respondent’s meeting in direct defiance of the respondent’s officials
and when she called for the ouster of the respondent as the employer of the jail
kitchen employees.
In Endicott Interconnect Technologies v. NLRB, 453 F. 3d 532 (D.C. Cir., 2006),
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a Board decision involving the discharge of
employee for disloyal remarks to the press following the sale of a company and its
purchase by EIT. White was quoted in the newspaper as saying “there’s gaping holes in
this business,” and that, with the recent layoff of 200 employees, there were “voids in the
critical knowledge base for this highly technical business. White was called in to speak
with one of the company’s owners who expressed displeasure over his reported
statements. He threatened to terminate White if it happened again; White understood and
said he was “on board.”
However, a couple of weeks later, White posted a message on a website that the
newspaper maintained as a public forum for comment on EIT’s acquisition of the local
plant. Responding to an anti-union posting on the site, White wrote:
To Mr. House: Why do you continue to try to bundle reasons why a union is
suspect and not so desirable for EIT employees? Why do you site [sic] all the bad
things about unions and ignore all the bad things IBM and EIT have done to the
employees and their families and the community at large?..... This business is
being tanked by a group of people that have no good ability to manage it. they
will put it into the dirt just like the companies of the past that were “saved” by
Tom Libous and George Pataki. ….The union is the beginning of a community
standing up for itself. It’s time is now.
6

Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980) enfd. 662 F. 2d 899 (1st Cir., 1981), approved in NLRB v.
Transportation Management, 462 U.S. 393 (1983).
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The Board found that White’s comments were all protected and that his discharge
violated the Act.
The Court first referenced NLRB v. Electrical Workers (Jefferson Standard), 346
U.S. 464 (1953), where the Supreme Court articulated the standard for determining
whether an employee’s actions are protected under section 7. The Court said that when an
employee attacks his employer, whether or not he is engaged in concerted activity, the
attack will deprive the employee of section 7 protection if it constitutes “insubordination,
disobedience or disloyalty.” In subsequent cases, the Board formulated a two part test
under which an employee’s communication to a third party is deemed protected under
section 7 if, first, it is related to an ongoing labor dispute, and, second, it is “not so
disloyal, reckless or maliciously untrue as to lose the Act’s protection.” Am. Golkf Corp,
330 NLRB 1238 ( 2000) (Mountain Shadows).
In this case, the Court believed the Board misapplied these standards. The Court
noted that, in the first newspaper interview, “the damaging effects of the disloyal
statements, made by an experienced insider at a time when EIT was struggling to get up
and running under new management, is obvious from the immediate reaction of IBM’s
vice president” who telephoned one of EIT’s owners because he was concerned about
EIT’s ability to supply IBM’s circuit board needs. But even after the company gave
White a second chance, he immediately posted a message saying that the current
management was causing the business to be “tanked” and that it was going “to put it into
the dirt.” The depth of this disloyalty under these conditions allowed the company to
discharge White without running afoul of the NLRA.
J. Bargainable topics
In Trustees of the University of Illinois v. Illinois Labor Relations Board,
(Docket No. 101450, 101508, 101542, 101558, January 19, 2007), the Illinois
Supreme Court ruled that a union’s proposal on parking arrangements for
personal vehicles was a mandatory subject of bargaining under the Illinois
Educational Labor Relations Act (115 ILCS 5/14(a)(1), (a)(5)). Using a three part
analysis, the Court found that parking was, first of all, “an issue of wages, hours
and terms and conditions of employment.” Second, that parking regulations were
not a matter of “inherent managerial authority” residing at the “core of
entrepreneurial control.” Third, since parking was not a matter of inherent
managerial authority, the court did not need to reach the third part of the test,
which would have been a balancing between the benefits that bargaining would
have on the decisionmaking process with the burdens that bargaining would
impose on the employer’s authority.”
In Prof’l Staff Congress-CUNY v. NY State Pub. Employment Relations Bd., 857
N.E.2d 1108 (N.Y. 2006), the Professional Staff Congress (“PSC”), the certified
collective bargaining representative of instructional and administrative employees of City
University of New York (“CUNY”), argued that CUNY refused to bargain over an
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intellectual property policy. In 1972, prior to the first CBA with PSC, CUNY adopted an
intellectual property (“IP”) policy addressing ownership of copyrights and patents, the
payment of royalties, and other issues related to intellectual property developed by
CUNY employees. The IP policy was never a subject of collective bargaining between
PSC and CUNY, and was never incorporated into any of the CBAs. When the parties
began negotiating a new CBA, CUNY simultaneously began the process of amending its
IP policy. PSC demanded negotiation over the IP policy, but CUNY declined to
negotiate it, asserting that Article 2 of the expired CBA, authorizing the CUNY Board of
Trustees to alter existing bylaws or policies respecting a term or condition of employment
not inconsistent with the CBA without PSC’s approval, constituted a waiver by the union
of the right to negotiate particular items, including the IP policy. CUNY argued that the
Article 2 waiver remained in effect during negotiations for a successor agreement, and
precluded the union from demanding that CUNY collectively bargain for modifications
to the IP policy.
PSC filed an improper practice charge with the State Public Employment
Relations Board (“PERB”), claiming that CUNY’s refusal to negotiate modifications to
the IP policy was an improper practice under Civil Service Law § 209-a(1)(d), requiring
parties to negotiate in good faith. The charge was not resolved at the time, because the
parties reached agreement on a new CBA, and PSC withdrew its proposal concerning the
IP policy along with all of its other outstanding bargaining demands. Prior to the
expiration of the new CBA, PSC demanded that the parties begin collective bargaining
for the successor agreement by discussing the IP policy. CUNY again asserted that
Article 2 of the CBA constituted a waiver by the union of the right to collectively bargain
changes to the IP policy. CUNY subsequently adopted a new IP policy and PSC filed an
amended improper practice charge reasserting the claim previously filed with PERB.
After a hearing, an administrative law judge agreed with CUNY that the union waived its
right to bargain over the IP policy in Article 2. However, the ALJ also held that the
waiver expired when the CBA expired, and therefore CUNY’s refusal to bargain for the
policy after the expiration of the CBA was an improper practice. Both parties appealed to
PERB, which upheld the ALJ’s decision that PSC had waived the right to negotiate
certain subjects, including the IP policy, under Article 2. Unlike the ALJ, PERB held
that the waiver remained in effect after the expiration of the CBA pursuant to the
Triborough Amendment, which provides that all terms of an agreement are deemed to
continue after the expiration of the CBA. PSC challenged PERB’s ruling and the
Appellate Division reversed, holding that CUNY had committed an improper practice
when it refused to negotiate the IP policy. The Appellate Division reasoned that
bargaining waivers should not be interpreted to survive a CBA absent an express
provision to that effect, and although employers are required to continue all the terms of
an expired CBA, no reciprocal duty is imposed on employees.
The Court of Appeals of New York first concluded that PERB reasonably
interpreted Article 2 as a waiver by PSC of its right to demand negotiation concerning
matters not addressed in the CBA, including the IP policy. The court examined the
language of Article 2, which specifically granted CUNY the right to make unilateral
decisions concerning the alteration of bylaws, policies and resolutions concerning a term
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or condition of employment. Article 2 further provided that PSC’s consent to the Board’s
action was not required prior to such action being taken or becoming effective, unless the
action was inconsistent with a stated term of the CBA, and as long as PSC received
notice and an opportunity to consult. The court stated that the IP policy fell within the
purview of Article 2 since it was never made part of the CBAs between PSC and CUNY
and its alteration did not conflict with any term of the CBA. Therefore, CUNY was not
required under the CBA to obtain PSC’s consent to any change in the policy, nor was it
obligated to negotiate modification of the policy with the union.
Next, the court analyzed whether the Article 2 waiver remained in effect after the
expiration of the CBA. The court upheld PERB’s conclusion that the waiver did remain
in effect based in part on Civil Service Law § 209-a(1)(e), requiring an employer to
continue all the terms of an expired CBA while a new agreement is being negotiated, and
PERB’s longstanding practice requiring employers to continue the terms and conditions
of employment to maintain the status quo during collective bargaining for a new
agreement. PERB interpreted the law as imposing reciprocal obligations on both the
employer and employee, and in cases in which members of a bargaining unit changed the
status quo after expiration of a CBA, PERB concluded that the employer was free to do
the same and could not be charged with an improper practice for altering the terms and
conditions of employment. Further, the court noted that the legislative history of the law
indicates that it was intended to enhance the negotiating process by preserving the status
quo until the parties can reach a new agreement and enacted into law what had become
standard practice. Thus, the practical effect of continuing all the terms of a CBA during
the status quo period is that mutual obligations are imposed on both employers and
employees, which is consistent with the statute and PERB’s long standing application of
the Triborough doctrine.
Finally, the court upheld PERB’s determination regarding CUNY’s negotiations
in good faith. In resolving PSC’s claim that CUNY failed to negotiate in good faith,
PERB assessed whether CUNY was required to collectively bargain the intellectual
property policy by reviewing the parties’ CBA, bargaining history, and past practices in
light of established PERB precedent. The court specifically rejected PSC’s assertion that
a waiver provision should be deemed to expire at the conclusion of the CBA unless the
parties include language indicating otherwise, as inconsistent with PERB precedent and
Civil Service Law § 209-a(1)(e) because, under the statute, the assumption is that all
terms of a CBA remain in effect during collective bargaining of a successor agreement.
The court stated that a concern that this practice would result in a waiver in perpetuity
was unfounded because the waiver itself was a mandatory subject of negotiation and the
union was free to change or eliminate that language in the collective bargaining process.
The court noted that because the Article 2 waiver was the subject of collective
bargaining, it was not more likely than any other term of the parties’ CBA to continue in
perpetuity. In addition, the court noted that PERB has long held that parties can
effectively prevent certain terms of a CBA from being continued after expiration of the
contract by using language that causes the term to expire at the conclusion of the CBA or
at some other point in time. Here, PSC and CUNY knew how to include a sunset clause
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in a contractual provision that they did not wish to carry into the status quo period as they
had inserted such clauses into prior agreements.

Also dealing with intellectual property is the case of Pittsburgh State
Univ./Kansas Nat’l Educ. Assoc. v. Kansas Bd. of Regents/Pittsburgh State Univ. and
Pub. Employee Relations Bd., 280 Kan. 408 (Kan. 2005). In 1997, the Kansas Board of
Regents/Pittsburg State University (“KBR”) proposed a policy dictating that KBR
retained ownership and control of any intellectual property created by faculty at Pittsburg
State University (“PSU”). The Pittsburg State University/Kansas National Education
Association (“KNEA”), the recognized employee organization of certain PSU faculty,
rejected this policy as unacceptable, proposed its own policy, and insisted that the parties
negotiate the matter. KBR responded by stating that it was not required under the Public
Employer-Employee Relations Act (“PEERA”) to negotiate the policy because the
subject of intellectual property rights was not a condition of employment, was preempted
by federal and state law, and was a management prerogative. KNEA filed a complaint
with the Public Employee Relations Board (“PERB”), and while the complaint was
pending, KBR formally adopted a different intellectual property policy giving some
intellectual property rights to employees of KBR’s institutions, without meeting and
conferring with KNEA. KNEA amended its complaint to allege that KBR’s unilateral
adoption of this policy was also a prohibited practice. The essence of the complaint was
that KBR had an obligation to meet and confer before adopting a policy regarding
ownership of intellectual property.
Under PEERA, KBR, a public employer, is required to meet and confer with
KNEA, a recognized public employee organization, only if ownership of intellectual
property is a condition of employment. If the ownership of intellectual property is a
condition of employment, the subject may be included in a memorandum of agreement if
no exception applies, i.e., if ownership of intellectual property is not preempted by state
or federal law, is not a right of a public employee, or is not a right of a public employer.
From the time KBR proposed the intellectual property policy and KNEA objected to it,
KBR argued that ownership of intellectual property was not a condition of employment
and that, even if it was, it could not be included as a subject in a memorandum of
agreement because the subject was preempted by statute and fell within the rights of the
public employer. As such, KBR asserted that it had no obligation to meet and confer with
KNEA and, therefore, did not commit a prohibited practice when it implemented the
policy.
PERB determined that there was no obligation to meet and confer because federal
and state law preempted the subject of intellectual property. The PERB hearing officer
assumed that the subject of intellectual property rights intimately and directly affected the
work and welfare of the public employees at issue here, without deciding that question.
He also declined to decide the application of the exception regarding the public
employer’s rights, as he determined first that federal and state laws were preemptive. He
focused solely on copyright law to find that the subject of intellectual property rights was
preempted by operation of federal law, and found that state law mandated that any funds

https://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol0/iss2/40
DOI: 10.58188/1941-8043.1119

26
26

Giovanni: Struggle for Resources: A Joint Management/Labor Challenge

received by a state educational institution or its employees from intellectual property be
dedicated solely to the use of that institution. He concluded that the disposition of funds
received from intellectual property was statutory, and therefore not a mandatorily
negotiable condition of employment. PERB reviewed the decision and upheld the
hearing officer’s initial order and decision. The district court reversed PERB’s decision,
concluding that intellectual property constitutes a condition of employment, and that the
requirement to meet and confer on the subject of intellectual property did not violate
Kansas law or in anyway impermissibly affect any inherent managerial policy. The court
also opined that the subject was not preempted, noting that all intellectual property is not
preempted by federal law and that the hearing officer relied solely upon copyright law,
and concluded that KBR committed a prohibited practice when it refused to negotiate.
The court of appeals reversed the district court and reinstated the decision of PERB,
holding that requiring mandatory negotiations concerning intellectual property is
preempted by federal copyright law.
In reversing the lower court’s decision, the Supreme Court of Kansas first
examined the Appeals court’s interpretation of the preemption exception. The court
stated that the issue was not whether federal legislation occupied the field to the
exclusion of a state statute, as such an interpretation is inconsistent with the language and
purpose of PEERA. Rather, the court stated, the appropriate inquiry was whether federal
law prevented the parties from negotiating regarding ownership of intellectual property
rights and entering into a memorandum of agreement which included that subject. If the
freedom to contract remained, the subject of ownership of intellectual property rights was
not preempted. The court examined copyright law and the work-for-hire doctrine which
provides that “[t]he employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is
considered the author . . . and, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a
written instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright.”
The court held that the plain language of the statute reflects that Congress clearly
contemplated that parties could negotiate ownership of a copyright, and allows the
subject of copyright ownership to be covered within a memorandum of understanding or
any other written agreement. The court stated that at most, 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) gave the
bargaining power to KBR in those situations where the work-for-hire doctrine applied to
ownership of a copyright, however, did not foreclose negotiation regarding ownership.
The court determined that an employer is never required to “negotiate away rights” under
PEERA, and rather than negotiating away rights, KBR and KNEA would be negotiating
consistent with the parties’ expectations. Although this could mean that KBR would
maintain ownership rights, KBR could also determine that it does not always have
ownership rights or is willing to contractually grant those rights to the faculty, as 17
U.S.C. § 201(b) does not prevent the parties from entering into a memorandum of
agreement regarding the subject of intellectual property rights.
The court next held that the Appeals court, the hearing officer, and PERB erred in
assuming that the work-for-hire doctrine would apply to any intellectual property created
by PSU faculty simply because those faculty members were employees of PSU. The
court reasoned that while it was not clear that there is an absolute teacher exception to the
work-for-hire doctrine as argued by KNEA, whether any particular creative work of a
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faculty member constitutes work for hire depends on whether the work is the type of
work the faculty member was hired to create; whether it was created substantially within
the time and space limits of the job; and whether it was motivated by a purpose to serve
the University employer, necessarily involving not just a case-by-case evaluation, but
potentially a task-by-task evaluation.
Further, in response to KNEA’s argument that the previous decisions in this case
only addressed copyright and not other types of intellectual property, the court held that,
as with federal copyright law, federal law regarding patent ownership does not prevent
the parties from entering into a memorandum of agreement regarding the subject of
patent ownership. To the contrary, the Patent Act specifically provides that the parties
may assign patent ownership rights. Thus, the court concluded that federal law did not
preempt any kind of intellectual property rights from becoming the subject of a
memorandum of agreement under PEERA.
The court next held that PERB erroneously interpreted the law in concluding that,
under state law, the disposition of funds received from intellectual property was fixed by
state statute and was therefore not a condition of employment. The court stated that
state law only governs whether monies received for a particular state education institution
are dedicated to that specific educational institution, and does not govern whether monies
received by an educational institution’s employees for the sale of intellectual property
belong to the educational institution or the employee. As such, the court concluded that
neither state nor federal law preempted the subject of ownership of intellectual property
from being the subject of negotiations between a public employer and a recognized
public employee organization or being included within the scope of a memorandum of
understanding.
The court next addressed whether intellectual property rights were a condition of
employment under PEERA. The court stated that the district court was authorized to
determine whether PERB had erroneously interpreted and applied the law to the facts of
the case. The court noted that the hearing officer did not make all findings regarding
facts about conditions of employment and failed to balance whether an item is
significantly related to an express condition of employment, and whether negotiating the
item would not unduly interfere with management rights reserved to the employer by law,
to determine if the item is mandatorily negotiable. According to the court, the district
court should have remanded the case to PERB for additional findings regarding whether
ownership of intellectual property is a condition of employment and whether the
exception of public employer rights in PEERA applied. As a result, the court remanded
this issue to PERB for further proceedings.

II. Arbitration
In Luzerne County Commissioners College, 2007 WL 79233 (Pa. Comm., 1/4/07), a
commonwealth court in Pennsylvania found that an arbitrator did not exceed his authority
by awarding a promotion to a faculty member when the college failed to answer his
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grievance over the denial in a timely fashion. The collective bargaining agreement in play
had a provision in the Grievance Article that read: “If a grievance is not responded to by
the President or his/her designee within the time frame prescribed in this Section, then
said grievance will be deemed resolved in favor or the grievance and/or the Association.”
Under the contract, the President had ten working days following the receipt of the
written grievance to file his or her answer. In this case, the assistant professor who was
denied promotion grieved under the CBA. He met with the President of the College,
along with his union representative, to discuss the grievance. A written response was due
by September 9, 2004. When the union did not hear from the President by September 15,
it contacted the President and told her that the union considered the matter resolved in the
grievant’s favor and that they expected an official letter notifying him of promotion.
The arbitrator ruled in favor of the union, noting that the language of the contract
was clear and unambiguous and that since no answer was filed by the President, the union
wins. On appeal, the college argued that since the president had discussed the matter
with the union earlier, there was no need for a formal answer. The arbitrator had
disagreed in light of the clear language of the contract and the court upheld his
interpretation. The college also argued that the arbitrator had no authority to grant
promotion and only the trustees could do that. However, since the promotion procedure is
within the four corners of the CBA, an arbitrator would have authority to grant
promotion. Moreover, since the Board of Trustees had signed the CBA, including the
language about automatic resolution of the grievance in the union’s favor if a timely
answer is not filed, the Board itself had recognized that promotion might be granted in a
case like this as a remedy by an arbitrator.
In Slippery Rock University v. Ass’n of Penn. State College and University
Faculties, 2007 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 12, 181 L.R.R.M. 2377 (Pa. Commw. Ct. January
16, 2007), the Association of Pennsylvania State College and University Faculties
(“APSCUF”) was signatory to a contract with the State System of Higher Education
(“SSHE”), of which Slippery Rock University (“the University”) is a part. The CBA
allowed limited grievance rights to a faculty member who had been denied tenure. Under
the CBA, the decision to grant tenure was to be based on a faculty member’s performance
in three areas: teaching effectiveness; scholarly growth; and service to the University and
community. The University had a policy with the local APSCUF chapter providing that
if there was a conflict between the Local Agreement and the CBA, the CBA would apply.
The Local Agreement stated that the tenure candidate must assume the burden of
providing substantial evidence that the departmental performance review categories have
been met, that it is the University president’s ultimate responsibility for the tenure
process, and that the president must ensure that all judgments are sustained by sufficient
and appropriate evidence. The president also must not employ criteria other than those
used by the departmental and University-wide tenure committees.
The Grievant became employed as an Assistant Professor of Computer Science at
the University in 1999. As a probationary faculty member, Grievant’s performance was
evaluated annually, pursuant to the terms of the CBA. According to the annual
evaluations, Grievant’s efforts to engage in scholarly growth were considered adequate
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by some University evaluators but lacking by others. When Grievant became eligible for
the tenure application process, she submitted an application for tenure which included an
enumerated list of seven scholarly growth activities. The Chairperson of the Computer
Science Department and the Departmental Committee both recommended the Grievant
for tenure, and noted her accomplishments in the area of scholarly growth. The
University-wide Tenure and Sabbatical Committee (UTSC) reviewed the
recommendations of the Chairperson and the Departmental Committee, as well as the
annual evaluations from the Grievant’s first four years of employment at the University.
Despite the recommendations for tenure by the Chairperson and Departmental
Committee, the UTSC voted to recommend the denial of Grievant’s application for
tenure based on inadequate scholarly growth. The Provost reviewed the tenure
application and the recommendations, and as a result of the conflicting recommendations,
contacted the Dean of the College and another professor in the Computer Science
Department in order to get more information about the Grievant. The Provost also met
with Grievant and permitted her to provide additional information about her scholarly
endeavors. Ultimately, the Provost recommended to the University president that
Grievant be denied tenure, and the president denied Grievant’s tenure accordingly.
As a result, APSCUF field a grievance on Grievant’s behalf pursuant to the CBA.
The grievance was denied at all levels, and an arbitration hearing was held. The
Arbitrator determined that the president violated the terms of the CBA and ordered that
Grievant be reinstated and deemed eligible for reconsideration for tenure. Subsequently,
the University filed a petition with the court challenging the award of the Arbitrator. The
University asserted that the Arbitrator’s award failed to draw its essence from the CBA,
and that the Arbitrator applied the incorrect burden of proof and used his own criteria to
evaluate Grievant’s tenure application rather than the criteria that was bargained for and
agreed to by the parties. Although both parties agree that the CBA did not expressly state
which party bore the burden of proof in a grievance procedure involving tenure, the
University argued that the Arbitrator violated the essence test when he applied the
incorrect burden of proof, misapplied precedent, and that the language of the CBA could
not be rationally interpreted to allow for the burden of proof applied by the Arbitrator.
In reaching a decision, the Arbitrator reviewed several arbitration cases to
determine the appropriate analysis to apply in the absence of a specified standard or
burden of proof in the CBA. The Arbitrator relied upon two previous arbitration decisions
concerning the denial of tenure of faculty members at other universities in the SSHE
system. The University argued that according to the first arbitration decision relied
upon, the standard applicable to a denial of tenure case is whether the Arbitrator finds
that the University acted in a manner that was arbitrary and capricious. Further, the
framework established in the second decision is essentially a just cause standard because
it required the University to first establish a sound, reasonable basis for the decision
denying tenure and then required Grievant to establish why that decision should be
disturbed. APSCUF disagreed with the University’s assertion that the Arbitrator applied a
just cause standard of review, arguing that the Arbitrator merely accepted the framework
established in the second decision relied upon. APSCUF further contended that the
Arbitrator applied the framework and concluded, after reviewing Grievant’s work history
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and scholarly growth, that there was no basis for the UTSC’s finding that Grievant lacked
responsiveness to areas of improvement that had been suggested to her, and that the
President’s description of Grievant’s scholarly growth as lacking was contrary to the
record. Based upon those findings, he concluded that the University failed to meet its
burden of establishing a sound, reasonable basis for denying tenure to Grievant. Because
the University failed to carry the burden, the Arbitrator held that no further inquiry was
required. APSCUF averred that this did not mean that the Arbitrator applied a just cause
standard, rather that the University failed to satisfy the first part of the two-part test.
The court vacated the award and remanded the case to the Arbitrator for further
proceedings consistent with its opinion. The court stated that the analysis applied by the
Arbitrator in this case was not rationally derived from the CBA, and therefore, the
decision failed to meet the requirements of the essence test. The court reasoned that the
CBA was silent as to the burden of proof and the standard of review to be applied in
denial of tenure cases. However, the Local Agreement, executed by the University and
the local APSCUF unit, set forth the burden of proof when a candidate applied to the
University for tenure, providing that the tenure candidate must assume the burden of
providing substantial evidence that the departmental performance review categories have
been met. Further, the Local Agreement provided that if there was a conflict between it
and the CBA, the CBA was controlling. The court stated that no conflict existed, as the
Local Agreement merely provided a burden of proof where the CBA was silent, and the
Arbitrator should have looked to the Local Agreement to supplement the terms of the
CBA. Therefore, pursuant to the Local Agreement, in a proceeding to challenge the
denial of tenure, Grievant bore the burden to establish that there was substantial evidence
that she met the departmental performance review categories for tenure. The court
concluded that in light of the Local Agreement and the CBA, the Arbitrator wrongly
placed the burden of proof on the University to establish that it had reasonable and sound
basis for denying tenure.
III. Shirts and Free Speech
Two interesting cases arose last year on employees wearing shirts and their
connection to free speech. The first case is Montle v. Westwood Heights School District,
(E.D. Mich., No. 05-10137, 6/15/06). In this case, a federal judge determined that a high
school teacher who wore a pro-union shirt into the class room was not engaged in
protected expression under the First Amendment. Montle, a probationary teacher, and
other teachers, wore bright green T-shirts with the initials of the union on the front, and
the slogan “Working without a Contract,” emblazoned on the back. When his four year
probationary term ended, the school district refused to renew his contract and grant him
tenure. He sued, claiming that the decision was in retaliation for his exercising his First
Amendment rights.
The Court cited the Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct,
1951 (2006) and observed that the Court had noted that a government entity has greater
freedom to restrict free speech when it is acting in its role as an employer, “but the
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restrictions it imposes must be directed at speech that has some potential to affect the
entity’s operations.”
While the Court agreed that in this case, Montle’s “speech” touched a matter of
public concern, it found that the interest of the employee did not outweigh the employer’s
interest in promoting the efficiency of its public service. Montle had upbraided his co
workers who did not wear the shirt and his confrontational behavior prompted complaints
to the principal by other teachers. Under those circumstances, the teacher’s right to free
speech was outweighed by the school’s “interest in ensuring professional demeanor and
good relations among its faculty.”
In the second case, the Sixth Circuit rejected the claims of three Kentucky parks
employees who were fired for refusing the tuck in their shirts as required by a new dress
code. The court found that their untucked shirts did not amount to speech on a matter of
public concern; that the revision of the dress code without prior notice did not violate
their right to due process; and that the new policy’s disparate impact on manual laborers
did not violated their right to equal protection.
The new policy stated that all parks employees who have contact with the public are
required to “maintain a professional, business like appearance,” and also prohibited
visible tattoos and body piercings that are offensive or not consistent with the mission of
the department. In an interpretative memo, the parks director sent an email to managers
spelling out more specific standards, including a flat prohibition on body piercing, except
for earrings; all visible tattoos and required the tucking in of all blouses and shirts. The
day after this was issued, the department discharged three workers who refused to tuck in
their shirts. Another employee was fired for not covering his tattoo that said “USN” – he
had previously served in the Navy.
While the judge found no matter of public concern on the question of tucking in your
shirt, he thought the tattoo issue was a bit closer because it arguably expressed his
support for the U.S. Navy. But the employee’s refusal to tuck in his shirt provided the
parks department with an independent reason for termination anyway. Roberts v. Ward,
No. 05-6305, 6th Cir., 2006).
IV. Legislation – H. 800 and related matters
On March 1, 2007, the House of Representatives passed H.800, a bill that, among
other things, would allow a union to become certified without an election by having an
NLRB card check procedure instead. A union that was able to produce signed
authorization cards from a majority of those workers in an appropriate unit could file a
petition with the Board and become certified after an NLRB check of the cards. IN
addition, the legislation would require binding arbitration for first contract negotiations if
the parties failed to reach an agreement within 90 days of the union being certified and
following a 30 day attempt at mediation. The results of arbitration would be binding on
the parties for two years. The House vote was 241-185.
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On March 30, 2007, Senator Ted Kennedy (D-Mass.) filed legislation (S. 1041) that
would give workers the right to form a union through the same card check procedure.
This bill is identical to the House bill. The measure had 46 co-sponsors, well short of the
60 needed to end an anticipated Republican filibuster of the bill. In sponsoring the bill,
Senator Kennedy said that “Unscrupulous employers routinely break the law to keep
unions out – they intimidate employees, harass them, and discriminate against them.
They shut down whole departments –even entire plants- to avoid negotiating a union
contract. It’s illegal and unacceptable.”
In contrast, Senator Michael Enzi (R-Wyo) said he opposed the bill as it would take
away workers’ free speech and the right to a secret ballot election. “This proposal is a
shameless attempt to rob workers of their most fundamental right – the right to a private
ballot – in order to bolster declining union membership.” The measure would open
employees to pressure, intimidation, and coercion by co-workers and labor union leaders.
While union advocates point out that many elections are delayed due to management
“stalling” tactics, the NLRB General Counsel’s Report on FY 06 operations for the Board
showed that initial elections in union representation cases were conducted in a median of
only 39 days from the filing of the petition, with 94.2% of all elections conducted within
56 days. (3643 representation cases total). Over 91% of those were conducted by
agreement of the parties.
Similar initiatives have been undertaken at the state level as well in allowing public
employee unions to be certified without an election, and seven states currently allow for
some or all of its public employees to be unionized without an election.7
Perhaps even more consequential in the federal bill is the provision calling for
binding arbitration in first contract situations. If the parties do not reach an agreement on
a first contract within 90 days of a request to bargain, either party can call in the Federal
Mediation and Conciliation Service. If FMCS fails to resolve the dispute within 30 days,
it will appoint an arbitrator who will issue a binding decision as to the disputed issues of
the contract. Such decision would be binding for two years on both parties, unless
extended by agreement.
The fundamental principle of labor law since the 1930s is that the parties should be
free to bargain in the arena of free enterprise without third parties mandated the
provisions of any collective bargaining agreement. The pending legislation would force
agreements through third party decision in the critical first collective bargaining
agreement situations if settlement isn’t reached in a very short period of time.

7

The seven card check majority states are Connecticut, Kansas (Teachers only), Minnesota, Nevada, New
Jersey, Oklahoma (Municipal Employees only) and Washington. A similar bill is pending in the Vermont
legislature. .Many other states allow voluntary recognition by an employer but in these seven states, a union
can insist on such recognition even if management wants a secret ballot election for the employees. A
similar bill is pending in the Vermont legislature.
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Finally, the bill would increase penalties on employers who engage in
discriminatory or coercive conduct during a union organizational campaign, or while the
first contract is being negotiated. An employee could receive treble damages in back pay
situations, as well as management paying up to a $20,000 civil penalty for each violation.

V. Same Sex Marriage and Related Matters
So far, there is still but one state that recognizes same sex marriages. In 2003, the
decision Goodridge v. Dept. of Public Health, 440 Mass. 309 (2003) was issued where
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the benefits, obligations and
responsibilities of civil marriage must also apply to same sex couples. The Court thus
found that the Commonwealth of Massachusetts violated the Massachusetts Constitution
when it refused to grant marriage licenses to same sex couples. Since May 17, 2004,
same sex couples can lawfully marry in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and since
then some 6500 couples have been married in the state.
At the present time, over half the states have amended their constitutions to bar
same sex marriages, and there are legislative and/or ballot initiatives in 11 other states
seeking to put constitutional gay marriage bans on the ballot in 2008, including
Massachusetts. On the other hand, there are pending bills in California, Illinois,
Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington to
legalize gay marriage. Civil union or domestic partnership bills are pending in nine
states.
Over the past year there has been some further litigation in the state courts on
same sex marriage and decisions are pending in some states.8 A few recent cases
involving the question of same sex marriage include:

NEW JERSEY: Lewis v. Harris
The New Jersey Supreme Court held that the legislature must provide full rights
and responsibilities to gay couples as heterosexual couples, either via civil unions or
marriage. The court ruled that same-sex couples and their families have a constitutional
right to the same benefits and protections that other New Jersey families take for granted.
It ordered New Jersey’s Legislature to provide these benefits and protections to same-sex
couples. The Legislature can do this by amending its marriage laws to include same-sex
couples, or it could enact a system, such as one that provides for civil unions, to extend
equal benefits to same-sex couples. New Jersey already has a domestic partner law that
provides certain protections to couples. The court gave the Legislature 180 days to adopt
the necessary legislation.

8

The gay rights organization Lambda Legal has an excellent summary of national activity in this area on
their web site. www.lambdalegal.org.
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In its ruling the Court said:
In light of plaintiffs’ strong interest in rights and benefits comparable to those of
married couples, the State has failed to show a public need for disparate
treatment. We conclude that denying to committed same-sex couples the financial
and social benefits and privileges given to their 57 married heterosexual
counterparts bears no substantial relationship to a legitimate governmental
purpose.
We are mindful that in the cultural clash over same-sex marriage, the word
marriage itself -- independent of the rights and benefits of marriage -- has an
evocative and important meaning to both parties. Under our equal protection
jurisprudence, however, plaintiffs' claimed right to the name of marriage is surely
not the same now that equal rights and benefits must be conferred on committed
same- sex couples.
Our decision today significantly advances the civil rights of gays and lesbians.
We have decided that our State Constitution guarantees that every statutory right
and benefit conferred to heterosexual couples through civil marriage must be
made available to committed same-sex couples. Now the Legislature must
determine whether to alter the long accepted definition of marriage.
Subsequently, the New Jersey Legislature passed a civil union law to comply with this
ruling. As such, New Jersey followed the same process as Vermont, which also
established civil unions a number of years ago in response to a state Supreme Court
ruling.
WASHINGTON: Andersen v. Sims Upheld the state’s exclusion of same sex
marriages. The ruling, a 5-4 decision that upheld the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA),
was handed down on July 26, 2006. The majority ruled that the DOMA does not violate
the state's constitution and that the will of the legislature or the people through a ballot
initiative measure process could revoke the controversial law.
In the plurality opinion, the Court wrote:
Limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples furthers procreation, essential to the
survival of the human race, and furthers the well-being of children by
encouraging families where children are reared in homes headed by the children’s
biological parents.
NEW YORK: Hernandez v. Robles. Decided in July 2006, the decision upheld the
state’s exclusion of same sex couples from marriage. As with the Washington court, the
decision emphasized that only the legislature could extend marital privileges to same sex
couples.
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NEBRASKA: Citizens for Equal Protection, Inc. et al v. Governor Michael O. Johanns
et al. Decided in July 2006 by the U.S. Circuit Court for the Eighth Circuit, essentially
upheld the state’s constitutional amendment that bans all relationship recognition-type
protections for same sex couple.
CALIFORNIA: Woo v. Lockyear . In December 2006, the state high court agreed to
hear an appeal of the case asking that same sex couples be allowed to marry. Case argued
during the past couple of weeks. Note: currently California grants full in-state marital
benefits by allowing same sex couples to register as domestic partners.
IOWA: Varnum v. Brien. Trial date set for July 2007 on whether same sex couples can
marry in Iowa.
CONNECTICUT: Kerrigan v. State of Connecticut. On appeal to high court on whether
same sex couples can marry in Connecticut.
MARYLAND: Conaway v. Deane and Polyak. On appeal to high court on whether same
sex couples can marry in Maryland.
MASSACHUSETTS: Cote-Whitacre et al v. Dept Public Health.
On September 29, 2006, Massachusetts Superior Court Justice Thomas Connolly
rules that there is no explicit prohibition in Rhode Island law preventing same sex
couples from marrying, and therefore Rhode Island same sex couples were free to come
to Massachusetts to marry. On the other hand, since New York had specifically ruled
against same sex marriage, New York same sex couples could not be married in
Massachusetts.
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